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Juvenile Competency Statutes:
A Model for State Legislation
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"Many things can wait; the child cannot. Now is the time his bones are
being formed, his mind is being developed. To him, we cannot say
tomorrow; his name is today."'
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INTRODUCTION
Juvenile justice is a relatively new system in the United States. Although many
assume that the juvenile justice system existed at the start of our nation, its origins
actually date back little more than a century. 2 Even so, juvenile offenders did not
receive court-recognized constitutional protections until the mid-1960s, and despite the
Court's recognition of these rights, the due process protections of the juvenile justice
system still remain in flux today.3 Increased juvenile accountability, more punitive
punishments, and frequent transfers to the adult penal system render the groundwork of
the juvenile system volatile.4 This recent trend toward a more adversarial juvenile
justice system demands more extensive juvenile due process protection during
delinquency hearings.
While the Supreme Court has recognized some rights and due process protections
for juveniles, it has never explicitly recognized ajuvenile's right to be found competent
before a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Therefore, states are left with the power to
protect, reject, or ignore a juvenile's competency right. States need to recognize
juvenile competency rights in order to adequately protect our nation's youth from an
increasingly punitive system. This Note outlines the history of juvenile competency
and the wide array of solutions adopted by various states. It ultimately shows the need
for each state to enact specific juvenile competency legislation that defines and outlines
the juvenile competency right as supported by scientific, developmental, and
psychological evidence. Many states do not have juvenile competency legislation, and
several of the states that do have legislation need to update their statutes to specifically
address key issues. This Note analyzes common provisions of existing state juvenile
competency statutes and makes suggestions for future legislation. Finally, this Note
drafts a "model" state juvenile competency statute by combining common provisions
from existing state statutes with new provisions supported by existing scientific and
developmental research.
Part I gives a brief overview of the historical origins of the American juvenile
justice system and the transformation of the system through modem United States
Supreme Court decisions. Part II outlines the origins of the adult right to competency
and the standards that the Supreme Court created for adult competency assessment.
Part III describes the unsettled nature of the juvenile competency right and emphasizes
the need for each state to have a detailed juvenile competency statute. Part III also uses
the recent Indiana Supreme Court decision, In re KG.,s as an illustration of the
problem facing states that recognize the juvenile competency right but do not have the
proper legislation to fully protect juveniles in those states. Part IV uses developmental
2. DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND
THE LAW iii (1992).
3. Id.; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending traditional adult due process
procedural safeguards to juveniles in the juvenile justice system); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that for ajuvenile court waiver ofjurisdiction the juvenile court must
conduct a meaningful review, and the juvenile is entitled to a hearing, counsel access to records,
and a reasoned statement from the juvenile court).
4. See SUSAN GuAIUNo-GHEzz & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2004).
5. 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004).
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psychology and developmental research on juveniles to illustrate the proven difference
between the adult brain and the juvenile brain. Part V surveys existing state juvenile
competency statutes and outlines the common provisions that are necessary for a
complete and detailed statute. Finally, Part VI explains the model juvenile competency
statute which is constructed using existing legislation, developmental research, and
comprehensive provisions. The proposed Model Statute is attached as Appendix.
I. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA: ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
A. A Targeted History of the Juvenile Justice System
The road to the modem juvenile justice system began in 1899 when the Illinois
Legislature created the first juvenile court for youths aged eight to seventeen years.
6
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act served as a model for the rest of the states, and all but
three states adopted similar acts by 1920.7 Political Progressives envisioned a
"benevolent treatment agency staffed by expert judges and assisted by social services
personnel."' This system became known as the "rehabilitative model" of juvenile
justice due to its focus on the treatment of juveniles.9 Progressives believed that
children were not morally accountable for their behavior due to their limited cognitive,
social, and moral development; therefore, the disposition of juvenile proceedings
focused on restoring the youth to industrious members of society.' 0 This rehabilitative
focus was one of the primary differences between the juvenile system and its adult
counterpart.
The legal foundation of the juvenile justice system is based on the English common
law doctrine of parens patriae." The doctrine grants juvenile courts broad power to
make decisions regarding the disposition of delinquents.12 These juvenile courts were
supposed to administer "personalized justice" to achieve the rehabilitative goal.' 3
Originally, the juvenile justice system granted judges broad discretion to conduct very
informal proceedings. 14 This informality was a maj or part of the rehabilitation process,
and it resulted in proceedings that were minimally adversarial.1
5
6. MARY J. CLEMENT, THE JUVENILE JUsTIcE SYsTEM: LAW AND PRocEss 16 (2d ed. 2002).
The Chicago Juvenile Court came into existence with the child-saving movement and the violent
decline of youth reform institutions. Id.
7. Allison Boyce, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46
ARK. L. REv. 985, 986 (1994).
8. Id. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474
(1987) (attributing the popularity of the Progressive movement in the early 1900s to the social
problems caused by rapid industrialization and modernization).
9. Boyce, supra note 7, at 986; see also Feld, supra note 8, at 474 (overarching theme in
all Progressive reforms was to "rehabilitate the deviant").
10. Boyce, supra note 7, at 986.
11. See CHAMPION, supra note 2, at 18.
12. Id.; see also In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 2004) ("[Tlhe parens patriae
doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, which implies a
broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system.").
13. CLEMENT, supra note 6, at 19.
14. Boyce, supra note 7, at 987. These proceedings were not open to the public and did not
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Although subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions somewhat eroded the
doctrine of parens patriae,16 the standard still does influence the modem juvenile
justice system. The majority of current juvenile dispositions involve relatively mild
sanctions such as probation, community service, therapy, or financial restitution to the
victim. 7 Juvenile confinement is a last resort for most offenses, 18 which demonstrates
continued dominance of the rehabilitative purpose. Today, juvenile justice judges
typically work with mental health professionals and social welfare staff to determine an
individualized treatment plan for the delinquent youth.19
B. Transformation of the Juvenile Justice System:
In re Gault and Subsequent Legislation
The United States Supreme Court altered the structure of the juvenile justice system
with its decision in In re Gault.20 Before In re Gault, it was possible for juveniles to be
institutionalized because of their misconduct, but the informal juvenile proceedings
lacked many of the procedural safeguards of the adult criminal system. The In re Gault
decision held that the informal procedure of the juvenile system violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' "[Ilt would be extraordinary if our
Constitution did not require the [juvenile system to have the] procedural regularity and
the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 22 The decision specifically
extended certain procedural rights to juveniles during the adjudication of delinquency
proceedings, including the right to counsel, the right to notice of charges, the right to
confrontation, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to appellate review, and
the right to a transcript of the proceedings. 23 Further Supreme Court decisions provided
juveniles with double jeopardy protection and required the government to prove guilt
have any formal records or transcripts. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv.
1083, 1133 n.105.
15. Boyce, supra note 7, at 987.
16. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17. CHAMPION, supra note 2, at 19 ("[T]hese [nominal and conditional] sanctions are
intended to reflect the rehabilitative ideal that has been a major philosophical underpinning of
parens patriae.").
18. Id. However, some juvenile justice experts support modem contemporary jurisprudence
that stresses juvenile accountability and the "get tough" movement. This movement has led to an
increase in punitive juvenile dispositions. Id.
19. Thomas Grisso, Michael 0. Miller & Bruce Sales, Competency to Stand Trial in
Juvenile Court, 10 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1987).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (extending many adult criminal justice procedural safeguards to the juvenile
justice system).
21. Id. at 13 ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.").
22. Id. at 27-28.
23. Christine A. Sullivan, Statutory Reform in the Georgia Juvenile Court System: Juvenile
Competency Issues Finally Addressed, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 879, 882 (1999). Note that the
Court did not specifically extend the right for a juvenile to be found competent in juvenile court.
See infra Part Il.A.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 These procedural requirements introduced adversarial
tactics and formality into a system otherwise devoid of these characteristics.
Advocates of juvenile procedural reform were confident that these Supreme Court
decisions would provide juveniles with necessary constitutional protections without
damaging the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system.25 Nevertheless, these reforms
were a significant departure from the framework of the original Illinois Juvenile Court
Act.26 Four principal themes emerged in response to the procedural reforms: a
jurisdictional reorganization over juveniles, a greater emphasis on criminal offenses
rather than on the youthful offenders, a need to limit dispositional judicial discretion,
and a need for more formal adjudicative procedures. 27 The Court's decisions
inadvertently initiated a convergence between the juvenile system and the adult
criminal system spurring new legislation in the states. Within twenty years of In re
Gault and its progeny, many state legislatures passed statutes that "criminalized"
juvenile courts and mandated more punitive punishments for youthful offenders.29
These statutes frequently removed non-criminal cases from the jurisdiction ofjuvenile
courts, increased the frequency of juvenile transfers to criminal court, and focused on
juvenile accountability.3 ° Ironically, the procedural safeguards intended to protect a
juvenile's due process rights became the same safeguards that subjected the juvenile to
a harsher, more punitive system.
The convergence of the juvenile and criminal justice systems continued throughout
the 1980s. The focus turned to the specific offenses committed by juveniles and the
harm inflicted upon their innocent victims. 3 1 The cry in many statehouses became,
"[d]o an adult crime, do adult time." 32 Legislatures responded with an enhanced
statutory focus on harsher punishments for juvenile offenders, and juveniles began to
pay for their misconduct with time.33 No longer were the original reformative goals of
the juvenile system enough to pacify the public.
24. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
25. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 157 (1998).
Advocates for this procedural reform referred to it as the "constitutional domestication" of the
contemporary juvenile proceeding. While supporters recognized that the reforms would have a
strong impact on the administration of juvenile justice, they did not believe that the reforms
would drastically alter the basic principles and goals of the juvenile system. Id. at 156.
26. Id. at 159.
27. Id. at 169. Note that each of these themes is a significant departure from the
rehabilitative and relatively unstructured setup of the original juvenile justice system.
28. Id. at 159, 169.
29. Id. at 169. States such as California, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska,
and West Virginia enacted statutes designed to increase juvenile accountability and protect the
public from delinquent youth. For example, California's Welfare and Institutions Code
included, as a part of its purpose, "protect[ing] the public from criminal conduct by minors...
[and] impos[ing] on the minor a sense of responsibility for his or her own acts." Id.
30. Id.
31. FRANK W. MILLER, ROBERT 0. DAWSON, GEORGE E. Dix & RAYMOND I. PARNAS, THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed. 2000). Note that Miller refers to
the United States Supreme Court's In re Gault decision as "the foundational legal event of the
modern juvenile justice system in America." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1-2 ("[L]egislatures increased the criminal-law attributes of the juvenile system
2006]
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The aftermath of these important judicial decisions and the subsequent state
statutory reforms still affect the juvenile justice system today. The increase in juvenile
crime peaked in 1995 and has since been on a steady decline.34 Nevertheless, the
statutory framework from the mid- 1980s remains, and the "juvenile system today much
more closely resembles the criminal system." 35 It is important that juveniles understand
the adjudicative process and the ramifications of delinquency proceedings as an
increasing number of adolescents are in jeopardy of punishment formerly reserved for
adults.36 Juvenile comprehension and participation is necessary for a fair and just
American juvenile justice system.
II. THE ADULT COMPETENCY RIGHT
The adult's right to be competent before proceeding through the criminal process
has historic origins that date back to English common law.37 As early as 1790, an
English court ruled that a defendant could not be tried unless "by collecting together
his intellects, and having them entire, he shall be able so to model his defense as to
ward off the punishment of the law."38 Early American courts also recognized the
incompetency plea, as exemplified by the court declaration that the man who attempted
to assassinate President Andrew Jackson was unfit to stand trial.39 In 1899, a federal
court declared that the right to be competent while on trial derived from the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.4° This constitutional basis gave courts around the
country a legal reason not to place an incompetent adult on trial.
The modem United States Supreme Court recognized that the "prohibition [of an
incompetent to stand trial] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.' '4 In
Dusky v. United States, the Court stated that the "test [for competence] must be
whether the [adult defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of proceedings against him. 42 The Court expanded the
itself, for example, by providing for criminal type record-keeping ... and providing that
juvenile court hearings that previously were closed to the public would be open, just like [adult]
criminal trials.").
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. Miller stresses that the juvenile system is still not identical to the adult criminal
system, but he challenges the juvenile system to "re-define itself, its mission and its methods."
Id.
36. Thomas Grisso, The Competence ofAdolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 5 (1997).
37. RALPH REISNER, CHIUSTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTi RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 963 (4th ed. 2004).
38. Frith's Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 318 (1790).
39. REISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 964.
40. Id. ("It is not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an
indictment involving liberty or life."). This Note focuses solely on a defendant's right to be
found competent to actually stand trial. Questions concerning a defendant's competency to be
sentenced have been raised in situations either where a "decompensation" occurs between trial
and sentencing, or where the defendant pleads guilty to the charges and therefore does not go to
trial. See Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1976).
41. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
42. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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test in Drope v. Missouri to include the requirement that the adult defendant be able to
"assist in preparing his defense. 43 A defendant must be able to participate in his own
defense, or the due process rights provided by Gideon v. Wainwright,44 Pointer v.
Texas,45 and Washington v. Texas46 are illusory. The adversarial process presumes that
a defendant will have adequate faculties to effectively participate in his own defense.
Accordingly, the adult competency right is now a well-recognized constitutional
protection, and many modem state statutes adopt the Drope and Dusky competency
standards verbatim.47
The Dusky standard makes it clear that a determination of an adult defendant's
competency focuses on the defendant's present abilities to understand the proceedings
and assist his attorney.48 This focus on rational and factual understanding suggests an
emphasis on cognitive functioning, and courts have held that "the mere fact that a
defendant has psychotic symptoms or has a particular IQ does not mean that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Neither mental illness nor the defendant's need
for treatment is [alone] sufficient for an incompetency finding. ' 49 This emphasis on a
multi-factored analysis illustrates the importance of cognitive ability and functioning in
the competency determination.50
Most jurisdictions allow any party to raise an issue regarding the defendant's
competency: the trial judge sua sponte, the defense attorney, or the prosecuting
attorney.51 If the adult's incompetency appears to be related to a mental illness or
possible mental retardation, the court will order one or more mental health
professionals to evaluate the defendant's mental state.52 States vary as to which party
bears the burden of proving that the defendant is competent or incompetent, but most
states have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard for the party determined
to bear that burden. 53 If the defendant is found competent to stand trial the proceedings
resume. However, if the defendant is found incompetent, most states then require
treatment for the purpose of restoring competency. 54 In Godinez v. Moran, the
Supreme Court stated, "while States are free to adopt competency standards that are
43. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
44. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Due Process Clause extends the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for federal criminal defendants to state criminal defendants).
45. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the Due Process Clause extends the Sixth
Amendment right for a federal criminal defendant to confront his accusers to state criminal
defendants).
46. 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (holding that the Due Process Clause extends the Sixth Amendment
right for a federal criminal defendant to present witnesses to state criminal defendants).
47. REISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 965.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 966. In order for a defendant with a mental illness to be found incompetent to
stand trial, the mental illness must "adversely affect [defendant's] ability to understand his
circumstances and make rational decisions about his case." Ryan v. Clarke, 281 F. Supp. 2d
1008, 1044 (D. Neb. 2003) (citing Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966)).
50. This rationale for the adult competency right supports a full extension of the
competency right to juveniles in the juvenile justice system. See infra Part IV.
51. REISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 977.
52. Id.
53. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.1 (a) (2d ed. 2003).
54. REIsNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 977.
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more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose
these additional requirements." 55 Therefore, the Court left specific adult competency
statute formulations up to the states.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the juvenile justice system and the adult
criminal justice system are distinct entities with different procedures and goals. 56
Therefore, the Court's decisions on adult competency standards do not automatically
extend to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
IIl. JUVENILE COMPETENCY AND THE NEED FOR STATUTORY DEFINITION
A. Supreme Court Ambiguity and State Power
Although In re Gault changed the procedural structure of the juvenile justice
system, it only extended a few adult due process procedural protections to juveniles.
The United States Supreme Court specifically tendered the right to notice, right to
counsel, right to confrontation, privilege against self-incrimination, right to appellate
review, and right to a transcript of the proceedings.57 The Court did not specify if this
was an exhaustive list or if state juvenile courts could apply at their discretion
additional procedural safeguards to juveniles.
Notably absent from the Court's list is a juvenile's right to be found competent.
Does a juvenile have the right to be found competent before a juvenile court
delinquency proceeding is held? Should states automatically assume that this "right"
falls within the same procedural boundaries of the extended Gault protections? Can an
eight-year-old offender ever be competent for a juvenile delinquency proceeding?
Today, nearly forty years after In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court has never
directly answered any of these important questions.
Without Supreme Court guidance, states have developed different approaches to
juvenile competency. As of 2002, "'thirty-five states and the District of Columbia [had]
case law and/or statutory provisions pertaining to adjudicative competence in juvenile
court."' 58 Conversely, Oklahoma case law flatly rejects that ajuvenile has a right to be
found competent.59 The Oklahoma court stated, "[T]he nature ofjuvenile proceedings
themselves, being specifically not criminal proceedings and being directed towards
rehabilitation of a juvenile, indicates to this Court the intent of the [Oklahoma]
legislature to deal with juveniles regardless of mental state in an effort to provide
rehabilitation and necessary treatment.' 60 As of 2002, the remaining fourteen states had
55. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
56. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Id.
58. Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenik, The Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile
Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 327, 332 (2004) (quoting
Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudication Competence in the Modem Juvenile Court,
9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 368 (2001)) (alteration in original).
59. See G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). Oklahoma is the only state to
explicitly reject a juvenile's right to be found competent before a delinquency proceeding.
60. Id. at 487. Since G.J.L, the juvenile criminal justice system has become more
criminalized and delinquency hearing sentencing is more severe. Therefore, the Oklahoma
courts might overturn G.J.L and acknowledge a juvenile competency right if a similar case were
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not addressed the juvenile competency issue. 61 Even the state juvenile competency
statutes that do exist vary immensely from state to state.
62
Most states recognize that juveniles have a right to be found competent before
proceedings begin, but states differ on how to procedurally determine if a juvenile is
competent. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a manner similar to other state courts,
justified a juvenile's competency right under Louisiana law on the ground that "the
right not to be tried while incompetent is a due process-fundamental fairness right...
[that should] be applicable to juvenile proceedings, unless some essential end of the
juvenile justice system will be thwarted by its application." 63 This rationale alone does
not adequately recognize that there are fundamental developmental differences
between adult criminal defendants and juvenile delinquents that should be considered
in every juvenile competency determination. These developmental differences need to
be statutorily acknowledged in order to adequately protect delinquent youth in juvenile
proceedings .
64
B. The Need for State Juvenile Competency Statutes
States that recognize the juvenile competency right need juvenile competency
statutes to adequately protect the due process rights of juveniles in their state. States
that recognize the right but do not have detailed juvenile competency statutes are
undermining the recognized competency right by not providing adequate protection for
juveniles in their system. Furthermore, judges in those state systems do not have a
guide for making a juvenile competency determination, and this can lead to the unequal
administration of justice around the state. Unfortunately, this problem is widespread.
Several states that recognize the juvenile competency right either have no statute to
correspond with the recognized right or have an inadequate statute that does not define
the key terms or procedures.
Therefore, many of the enacted juvenile competency statutes could use revisions.65
The statutes are often vague and leave much room for interpretation of key issues. All
juvenile competency statutes should at least address the definition of competency, the
procedure for raising the competency issue, the requirements for expert evaluation,
specific expert report criteria, acceptable sources of incompetency, and the aftermath
of an incompetency finding. Each of these provisions should also address the specifics
of those requirements. For example, when a state determines that an expert should
evaluate a potentially incompetent juvenile, the statute should specify the number of
heard today.
61. Frost & Volenik, supra note 58, at 332. Note that the Indiana Supreme Court addressed
the issue of juvenile competency in May 2004 and held that juveniles do have a right to be
found competent. See In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004); infra Part IH.C.
62. See infra Part V.
63. In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978).
64. See infra Parts IV, VI, and Appendix.
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.223(2) (West 2001) (does not define the term
"immaturity" and does not give a specific chronological age or range); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
356 (2005) (does not mention mental illness or mental retardation, and does not specify the
number of evaluating experts or a required professional degree); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
938.295(2)(b) (West 2004) (does not give specific criteria for the expert report other than a
broad definition of the Dusky competency standard).
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required experts, the professional degrees the experts must possess, and which parties
can retain experts. 66 It is important that a statute adequately address these issues to
avoid confusion and delineate standards that will be followed equally by each juvenile
court within the state. Detailed statutes increase the likelihood that justice will be
equally administered across the state, thereby increasing the likelihood that juvenile
rights will be equally protected.
Comprehensive juvenile competency legislation becomes more important as the
juvenile justice system becomes more adversarial. In the wake of significant United
States Supreme Court decisions 67 and public outcry for juvenile responsibility, 68
juvenile system punishments continue to grow increasingly punitive. It is crucial for
juveniles to adequately understand the proceedings against them as the outcomes are
increasingly similar to adult punishments. As a result, a juvenile's right to be found
competent is vital. This state-recognized right must be supported by specific state
legislation that specifies evaluation procedures, reporting techniques, and key
definitions. Comprehensive statutes allow juvenile judges to obtain information
necessary to determine a juvenile's competency. This important issue must be
addressed immediately both in states without juvenile competency legislation and in
states with deficient statutes.
C. An Example of the Problem: Indiana's Response to Juvenile Competency
The Indiana Supreme Court first addressed the juvenile competency issue in 2004.
In re K.G.6 granted Indiana juveniles the right to be found competent before a criminal
delinquency proceeding, and also held that Indiana's adult competency statute did not
apply to these juvenile cases. The court noted that neither Indiana case law nor Indiana
statutory provisions specifically recognized the juvenile competency right.
Nonetheless, the court did not apply section 31-32-1-1 of the Indiana Code,70 which
would have granted the adult competency right to juveniles by default. 71 The court
stated, "[W]e do not believe the [Indiana] Legislature intended that the adult
competency statute should apply to juveniles." 72 Instead, the court utilized section 31-
32-12-1 of the Indiana Code73 and granted the juvenile court the power to examine
66. States can choose to have experts appointed by the court, the juvenile, the state, or they
can allow each of these parties to retain their own experts. Furthermore, states can choose
whether to allow psychologists, psychiatrists, medical doctors, or a combination of professionals
to evaluate the juvenile.
67. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
68. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
69. 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004).
70. "If a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the procedures governing [adult] criminal
trials apply in all matters not covered by juvenile law." IND. CODE § 31-32-1-1 (2004) (emphasis
added). This section specifies that the adult competency standard should apply to juveniles since
no Indiana juvenile statute addresses juvenile competency.
71. InreK.G.,808N.E.2dat637.
72. Id. at 637.
73. The statute provides the circumstances under which an Indiana juvenile court may
"authorize mental or physical examinations or treatment." IND. CODE § 31-32-12-1 (2004). Note
that this statute does not mention competency.
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juveniles with possible competency issues. The court held that the statute "allows for
the examination and/or treatment of a child after a delinquency petition has been filed
in order to determine the child's competency." 74 Ironically, the court admitted that it
construed section 31-32-12-1 "comprehensive[ly]" and that "the statute does not
specifically mention 'competency.' -
7
Section 31-32-12-1 of the Indiana Code is too vague to protect the important rights
it now attempts to guard. To adequately protect the rights of delinquent juveniles, the
State must define juvenile competency with more than one vague statute that does not
even use the word "competency." Section 31-32-12-1 is not sufficient to guide Indiana
juvenile courts in juvenile competency determinations. The statute allows a juvenile
court to authorize mental or physical examinations and treatment if a physician certifies
that an emergency exists. 76 Unfortunately, the statute does not specify what constitutes
an emergency or what type of mental examination can be conducted during an
"emergency." Although the statute does authorize an examination to provide
information for the dispositional hearing, it is not specific enough to adequately guide a
juvenile court in a competency determination. Indiana juvenile courts need specific
definitions to use and procedures to follow during juvenile competency determinations.
Since the United States Supreme Court left juvenile competency determinations to
the individual states, the duty falls on each state to provide guidance to its juvenile
court if the state chooses to recognize the juvenile competency right. The Indiana
Supreme Court correctly followed many other states and recognized ajuvenile's right
to be found competent before a delinquency proceeding, but the court did not give the
Indiana juvenile courts proper guidance on how to define, determine, or assess juvenile
competency. Therefore, as with most state legislatures, the Indiana General Assembly
must pass legislation to protect the right the Indiana Supreme Court recognized.
Indiana is not the only state in this situation. Many states do not even have juvenile
competency legislation, and of the states that do, many have incomplete and inadequate
statutes. Legislatures in these states should take cues from the minority of states with
77decent juvenile competency statutes. An analysis of diverse state legislation can
provide a state legislature with the information necessary to enact a statute that protects
a juvenile's right to competency and also guides juvenile courts in the proper
competency determination procedure.
IV. THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
A. Developmental Psychology and Juvenile Competency
New legal reforms and the increase of punitive sentences in the juvenile justice
system require us to take a serious look at the issues surrounding juvenile competence.
Traditionally, mental illness or mental retardation provided the basis of an
incompetency finding, but modem developmental psychologists argue that, due to the
increase of younger adolescents in juvenile court, the competence question should also
74. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 639.
75. Id.
76. IND. CODE§ 31-32-12-1(1).
77. See infra Part V.
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78focus on developmental immaturity. In 1995, Vance Cowden and Geoffrey McKee
conducted a study where forensic mental health professionals evaluated the
competency of 136 juvenile delinquents. 79 The clinicians reviewed and assessed each
juvenile's offense and school records, and conducted clinical interviews with the
juvenile and his family.8° The study found that the percentage of competent adolescents
increased with chronological age. 8' The study showed that twenty percent of the nine-
to twelve-year-olds were competent, half of the thirteen- to fourteen-year-olds were
competent, and the percentage of competent fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds equaled
percentages found in studies of adult competency. The Cowden and McKee study
showed a clear correlation with the age of the defendant and the likelihood of
competence. Thus, as developmental skills and capacities increase with age, so too
does the percentage of juveniles found competent.
Developmental psychology provides valuable insight into the juvenile competency
field. Richard Bonnie classifies relevant competency abilities using two concepts from
the Dusky standard. 83 First, the abilities related to the juvenile's competence to assist
counsel must be analyzed. These abilities include the capacity to understand the
charges, understand the possible penalties, assist counsel, and understand the roles of
various people in the trial process.84 In addition, the juvenile must appreciate the
significance of each of these matters for his own situation.85 For example, a juvenile's
understanding of possible dispositions of a delinquency proceeding is of little value if
the juvenile does not appreciate that these dispositions can occur in his case. The
second prong of Bonnie's classification is "decisional competence." This prong refers
to the capacity of a defendant to engage in the reasoning process and make specific
judgments with input from counsel.86 Decision making involves "the ability to consider
the potential consequences of several options, to make subjective judgments about the
desirability and probability of those consequences, and to compare them."
87
Developmental psychologists advocate that adolescents have limited abilities to
appreciate and understand many of the above concepts due to their immature
developmental capacities.
88
78. Grisso, supra note 36, at 6 ("[Unfortunately], [c]ourt clinicians have little to guide them
in assisting the courts to weigh adolescents' immaturity as it relates to trial competence.").
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. The ultimate decision of competency was made by a clinical team rather than one
clinician.
81. Id. Although this study does provide valuable initial data for understanding juvenile
competence, it does not specifically divide competency characteristics into the categories that
may be helpful to a juvenile in a court proceeding.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id.
85. Id. ("For example, a defendant's understanding that defense attorneys are intended as
advocates will be of little value if mental disorder or developmental disability prevents the
defendant from believing (appreciating) that this advocacy will be provided in his or her case.").
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137
(1998); Grisso, supra note 36; Grisso, supra note 19.
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Juveniles' capacity for decision making in the justice system has not been
extensively studied. However, existing data does suggest that certain adolescents have
limited abilities in areas directly related to juvenile adjudicative competence. 89
Specifically, the weight of evidence suggests that juveniles thirteen-years-old or
younger are at a high risk for deficits in competence-related abilities.9° Unfortunately,
few state statutes actually recognize age or developmental immaturity as a valid basis
for a juvenile incompetency finding.91 Most states require that a diagnosable mental
illness or physical developmental disorder serve as the basis for an incompetency
finding.92 By requiring an incompetency finding to be based on a diagnosable disorder,
these states ignore youth whose age-related developmental capacities alone could
impair their ability to competently proceed at a hearing.
Developmental psychologists advocate that states should not require juvenile
competency to be predicated on a finding of mental illness or mental retardation.
93
First, the mental illness requirement does not take into account the developmental
concerns noted above. Second, some psychotic mental disorders, such as
schizophrenia, normally do not manifest symptoms until early adulthood.94 Although
the typical delusions and hallucinations associated with schizophrenia may not be
present in the juvenile, the early form of the disorder may still be responsible for
deficits in certain capacities needed for adjudicative competency. 95 Consequently, a
pre-schizophrenic juvenile in a delinquency proceeding will probably not exhibit the
classic symptoms of schizophrenia at his young age, but the disorder may still affect his
adjudicative competence. Unfortunately, state statutes that require a finding to be based
on a diagnosable condition at the time of the proceeding will not recognize this pre-
schizophrenic juvenile's genuine incompetency.96
89. See Grisso, supra note 36, at 9-20 (providing an in-depth look at various empirical
studies relating to the interaction between juvenile development and adjudicative competence);
Thomas Grisso, et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison ofAdolescents' and
Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (Aug. 2003).
90. Grisso, supra note 36, at 20. It is not a coincidence that thirteen seems to be the "magic
age" for development and increased competence. Grisso's research is supported by the recent
NIMH study on juvenile brain development. See infra Part IV.B.
91. Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 88 (Thomas Grisso
ed., 2000) ("Formalistic, disorder-oriented application of current standards, therefore, may result
in unfair jeopardy for youths whose developmental incapacities impair their ability to participate
in their own defense."); see also infra Part V.E. 1.
92. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(c) (2005); TEx. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 55.31(a)
(Vernon 2002).
93. See Grisso, supra note 36; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental
Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005).
94. Id. at 87; see also American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 37 (4th ed. 1994).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., TEx. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 55.31 (Vernon 2002); infra Part V.E.2.
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B. NIMH Study on Juvenile Biological Brain Development
Even juveniles without mental illness or mental retardation may be significantly
developmentally impaired and incompetent to proceed in a delinquency hearing as a
result of their chronological age. A study by the National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH), an agency of the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
reveals that the center of reasoning and problem solving are among the last to
developmentally mature in the brain.97 Researchers conducted a ten-year study of brain
scans of children ages four to twenty-one to see if there was a typical pattern of brain
maturation during this crucial developmental period.9 s The study concluded that the
higher-order brain centers, such as the prefrontal cortex, do not fully develop until
young adulthood.99
The study specifically found that the first areas of the brain to mature are the
extreme front and back regions, which are the regions associated with the most basic
functions such as sense processing and movement.'0° The parietal lobes, which are
involved in spatial orientation and language, develop next.) ° The prefrontal cortex,
which involves "executive functions," matures last.102 Just prior to puberty there is a
growth spurt of gray matter in the juvenile brain, predominately in the "seat of
executive functions.' 0 3 "Striking growth spurts can be seen from ages six to thirteen in
areas connecting brain regions specialized for language and understanding spatial
relations. ' '1°4
The research also compared magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scans of
young adults, ages twenty-three to thirty, with teens, ages twelve to sixteen. The scans
looked for signs of myelin, the cylindrical covering on the axons of some neurons.1
05
Additional myelin implies an excess of mature, efficient connections within the gray
matter of the brain. As expected, a comparison of the teen and young adult brain scans
showed the largest difference in myelin content in the frontal lobe, with the young adult
brains containing significantly more myelin than the teenage brains.'16 This research
97. Press Release, National Institute of Mental Health, Imaging Study Shows Brain
Maturing, (May 17, 2004), [hereinafter Press Release] available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/press /prbrainmaturing.cfm.
98. Id.
99. Id. The researchers condensed fifteen years of developmental brain maturation into a
six-second video that can be seen at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/press/prbrainmaturing.mpeg (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005). For the complete scientific results, see Nitin Gogtay, et al., Dynamic
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci. 8174 (2004), available at
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10. 1073/pnas.0402680101.
100. Press Release, supra note 97.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Teenage Brain: A Work In Progress, National Institute of Mental Health, Sept. 16,
2005, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The teen frontal lobe was the only lobe that appeared significantly immature in
comparison to the young adult brain. Ironically, this coincides with the late teen/early twenties
age-of-onset of schizophrenia, a disorder characterized by impaired executive (frontal) brain
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implies that young adults are better equipped to rationalize and understand their
environments due to the physical increase of myelin in the frontal lobe of the brain. 107
In light of this concrete biological evidence, young juveniles should be presumed
chronologically incompetent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.10 8 Scientific studies
conclude that the executive center of the brain does not fully develop until young
adulthood. The brain of a young juvenile has not yet reached the developmental
capacity necessary to allow the juvenile to fully articulate his thoughts and adequately
understand complex situations. 109 A lack of these skills can adversely affect the young
juvenile in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding. A young juvenile who cannot articulate
pertinent thoughts to defense counsel may be hindered at legal proceedings because of
this limited participation in his own defense. Juveniles who are incompetent due to
developmental brain immaturity are currently not receiving full due process protection
in states that recognize the juvenile competency right but do not recognize this
biological origin of incompetency.
V. CURRENT STATE STATUTES AS A GUIDE FOR
FUTURE JUVENILE COMPETENCY LEGISLATION
A survey of existing juvenile competency statutes shows that many of the existing
statutes have common provisions. These common provisions include a definition of
"competency," a procedure for raising the competency issue, specific requirements for
expert evaluation, expert report criteria, acceptable sources of incompetency, and the
aftermath of the incompetency finding. States without juvenile competency legislation,
such as Indiana, should look to these common provisions as a starting point for new
legislation." 0 Each state can modify the common provisions to fit individual state
needs. It is imperative that juvenile competency legislation define important terms for
juvenile courts and guide them in the actual competency determination procedure to
ensure that juveniles throughout the state receive equal treatment. This Part outlines the
common provisions found in juvenile competency statutes and uses existing statutes as
examples.
functioning.
107. For further biological research on brain development, see Jay N. Giedd, et al., Brain
Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 861 (Oct. 1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell, et al., LocalizingAge-Related Changes in
Brain Structure Between Childhood and Adolescence Using Statistical Parametric Mapping, 9
NEUROIMAGE 587 (1999).
108. This Note considers "young juveniles" to be under the age of thirteen at the time the
issue of competency is raised. See infra Part V.E. 1; Part VI (arguing that the Model Statute
should account for a rebuttable presumption of incompetence for juveniles under the age of
thirteen).
109. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 93, at 811-18 (stating that developmental psychologists
agree with this biological data and use it to advocate for court recognition of chronological
juvenile incompetence).
110. States with inferior and ill-constructed juvenile competency legislation should also use
these common provisions to modify their existing legislation and to more adequately define and
protect a juvenile's competency right.
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A. Definition of "Competence"
Almost every juvenile competency statute utilizes the Dusky standard"' to define
competency. While some states define "competence" and other states define
"incompetence," some version of the Dusky standard is the preferred definition.1 2
Arizona's statute states that "'[i]ncompetent' means a juvenile who does not have
sufficient present ability to consult with the juvenile's counsel with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding or who does not have a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings against the juvenile."' 13 Note that the "or" between the two clauses
allows for an incompetency finding if the juvenile does not satisfy either prong of the
definition. The disjunctive used in this instance means the juvenile must sufficiently
understand the proceedings against him and have the ability to reasonably assist
defense counsel. While it may seem counterintuitive that the juvenile competency
definition tracks the adult definition verbatim, state juvenile competency statutes
provide for differences in other areas.
B. Procedure for Raising Competency Issue
Most states adopt similar procedures for raising the juvenile competency issue.
Typically, the issue can be raised sua sponte by the juvenile court, on the motion of the
juvenile's attorney, or by the attorney representing the state. 1 4 This flexibility assures
that the juvenile has a fair chance of having his competency examined before the
delinquency proceeding because any interested party can raise the issue. Once
competency is at issue, state statutes typically require an examination of the juvenile
and a stay in the proceeding. "15 This standard complies with the policy rationale that an
incompetent juvenile not be subjected to proceedings until he is competent to
understand the proceedings.
C. Experts
State statutes differ on the exact specifications required for experts to examine the
juvenile's competency. The Florida statute requires that competency be "based on an
111. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
113. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-291 (2005) (emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
985.223(l)(f) (West 2001) (defining juvenile competency with the Dusky standard). Note that
the statutes that define "incompetent" place an "or" between the two clauses, while the statutes
that define "competent" place an "and" between the two clauses.
114. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-291.01(B) (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(a)
(2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.223(1) (West 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356(A) (2005). But
cf TEx. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 55.31 (b) (Vernon 2002) (suggesting that the incompetency issue
can be raised only by the juvenile's counsel or the attorney for the state).
115. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(c)(l)-(2) (2005) (providing for a stay in the
proceeding after an examination shows the juvenile is incompetent to proceed); TEx. [FAM.]
CODE ANN. § 55.3 1(c) (Vernon 2002) (providing for a stay in the proceedings and a required
examination of the juvenile once the court determines that there is probable cause of the
juvenile's incompetency).
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evaluation of the child's mental condition made by not less than two nor more than
three experts appointed by the court."' 1 6 While the Florida statute does specify the
number of experts needed for a competency determination and that such experts should
be court-appointed, the statute does not detail what qualifications the "experts" must
have to examine the juvenile. While other provisions of the statute refer to "mental
health professionals," the statute does not specify what professional degree, if any,
these "experts" must possess. 17 In comparison, the Arizona statute states, "the court
shall appoint two or more mental health experts, at least one of whom is a psychiatrist
licensed pursuant to [Arizona specifications]."' 18 This statute is more thorough because
it specifies the minimum number of mental health experts needed for a competency
examination and requires that at least one of the experts have the specified professional
degree.
In addition, another provision of the Arizona Code clarifies that any party can still
retain its own expert to conduct a competency evaluation at the party's expense." 19 This
provision varies significantly from the aforementioned Florida Code, which requires
that the experts be appointed by the court.' 20 While court-appointed experts may be
more neutral in determining competency, it is important that each party have the right
to retain its own expert as the juvenile system becomes more adjudicative. 121 However,
a system that uses court-appointed experts furthers the original rehabilitative goal of
the juvenile justice system and eliminates the need for each party to expend time and
resources finding an expert that will evaluate the juvenile in a light favorable to its
argument.
D. Expert Report Criteria
States also vary on the specific requirements an evaluating expert's report must
address. Some states give a large amount of discretion to the expert to describe
whatever specific abilities the expert deems necessary in the examination report. For
example, the Wisconsin Code designates that the expert report:
shall describe the nature of the examination and identify the persons interviewed,
the particular records reviewed and any tests administered to the juvenile....
[T]he report shall also contain an opinion regarding the juvenile's present mental
capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his or her defense and, if the
examiner reports that the juvenile lacks competency to proceed, the examiner's
opinion regarding the likelihood that the juvenile, if provided treatment, may be
restored to competency .... 1
2 2
116. FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(l)(b) (West 2001).
117. § 985.223(l)(d)-(e).
118. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 8-291.02(A) (2005).
119. § 8-291.02(D).
120. See supra text accompanying note 116.
121. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the court to appoint
its own experts and each party to also present its own experts. While these rules do not apply in
state juvenile courts, it is important to keep the rules in mind as the juvenile system becomes
more adjudicative.
122. Wis. STAT. § 938.295(2)(b) (West 2004).
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This statute identifies key material that the expert examination report must address, but
it does not direct the examiner to examine and report on precise abilities that will be
critical in a competency determination.' 23 Imprecise evaluation criteria could lead to
inconsistent reports on the same juvenile if the experts did not evaluate the juvenile
using the same criteria.
Other state statutes are more detailed and demand exact criteria in the examination
report. The Arizona Code dictates that the report shall include at least: the name of the
mental health expert; a description of the nature, content, extent, and results of the
examination and any test results; facts on which the findings are based; and the expert's
opinion as to the competency of the juvenile.' 24 Note that the statute still leaves some
discretion to the expert to report on what he deems necessary for a proper juvenile
competency determination. Thus, while the Arizona statute gives more detail than the
Wisconsin statute, it still does not quite get to the heart of the juvenile competency
issue because it does not address the capabilities that a juvenile should have in order to
be deemed competent to proceed in a delinquency hearing.
The Florida statute, however, demands specific report information that goes directly
to the root of the juvenile competency issue. Section 985.223 of the Florida Code
mandates that each expert report must address the child's capacity to:
(1) Appreciate the charges or allegations against the child (2) Appreciate the range
and nature of possible penalties that may be imposed in the proceedings against
the child, if applicable (3) Understand the adversarial nature of the legal process
(4) Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at issue (5) Display
appropriate courtroom behavior (6) Testify relevantly. 125
The advantage of the Florida statute is that it instructs the expert examiner to address
issues that will be extremely relevant to a competency determination. While other
states leave it to the examiner to identify and report on these important characteristics
and abilities, the Florida Code requires that each expert report address these salient
issues. These standards enable the juvenile court judge to weigh the information and
adequately determine if the juvenile is competent to proceed. This statute also leads to
uniformity between various expert reports because each report will focus on these
specific criteria. As a result, it will be easier for a judge to compare the expert
evaluations and make a proper competency determination of the juvenile.
The Arkansas Code parallels many of the Florida provisions for expert report
criteria, but it adds some requirements of its own. The Arkansas Code requires the
expert to include the juvenile's capabilities to extend his thinking into the future,
consider the impact of his actions on others, verbally articulate himself in a coherent
manner, display logical decision-making abilities, and accurately and reliably relate a
sequence of events. 26 Requiring an expert to report on these specific abilities forces
the expert to consider how the juvenile will actually perform in a delinquency
proceeding. As a result, Arkansas juvenile competency expert reports will focus on
123. Cf. FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(l)(f) (West 2001) (listing mental capacities that must be
addressed by a court-appointed expert when evaluating a child's competency).
124. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 8-291.07(B)(l)-(4) (2005).
125. FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(l)(f)(l)-(6) (West 2001).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(b)(7)(C)(ix)(b) (2002).
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delinquency-specific criteria and guide the juvenile court judge in his determination.
The proposed model juvenile competency statute will include provisions from both the
Florida Code and the Arizona Code in order to fully address thejuvenile's competency
and expected performance in a delinquency proceeding.' 
27
E. Causes of Incompetency
Perhaps the most contentious issue within juvenile competency legislation is the
determination of what constitutes an acceptable cause ofjuvenile incompetency. Some
states require incompetency to be the result of a mental illness or mental retardation,28
while other states do not even mention those disorders in their juvenile competency
provisions.129 These discrepancies illustrate the difficulty in determining the etiology of
juvenile incompetency. Juveniles face unique issues with competency due to their
limited development. While this limited development can affect ajuvenile's ability to
comprehend information requisite for competency, it can also hide severe mental
illnesses that may not fully appear until early adulthood. 130 Some state statutes allow
for incompetency to be based solely on age or developmental immaturity, but other
states expressly maintain that these factors should not be taken into consideration.
1. Age and Immaturity
Section 985.223 of the Florida Code states that "[a] child who has been adjudicated
incompetent to proceed because of age or immaturity, or for any reason other than for
mental illness or retardation, must not be comitted... for restoration-of-competency
treatment."' 31 The Florida Code is one of the few statutes that expressly allows
developmental immaturity to be a basis for juvenile incompetency. Unfortunately, the
Florida Code does not identify a specific chronological age and does not define
"immaturity."' 132 One can presume that "immaturity" refers to a deficiency in the
developmental skills necessary for competency, but this definition is not mentioned in
the statute. Nevertheless, this section of the Florida Code is admirable because it
recognizes that the developmental immaturity of juveniles can result in an
incompetency finding.
The Florida Code further orders that juveniles deemed incompetent based on this
provision shall not be committed to competency restoration treatment. These juveniles
do not need mental health treatment or hospitalization; they merely need time for their
developmental capacities to mature. Although the Florida Code is one of the few that
allows for an incompetency finding based on age or immaturity, this conclusion is
supported by empirical data provided by developmental psychologists and biological
127. See infra Appendix.
128. See, e.g., TEx. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 55.3 1(a) (Vernon 2002).
129. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356 (2005).
130. See supra Part IV.A.
131. FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(2) (West 2001).
132. Developmental research shows that it is not possible to have a per se chronological age
for competence, but the studies do realistically suggest that a presumed incompetence age of
thirteen would be consistent with the research. See supra Part IV; infra Part VI.
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data provided by neurologists.' 33 The age/immaturity cause of incompetency is a valid
etiology that should be acknowledged by all state juvenile incompetency statutes.
Like the Florida Code, the Arkansas Code recognizes chronological immaturity as a
cause of juvenile incompetency. However, the Arkansas Code goes further by
presuming some juveniles incompetent in certain murder cases, and this presumption is
based solely upon the juvenile's age. Section 9-27-502 of the Arkansas Code mandates
that any juvenile under the age of thirteen at the time of the alleged offense who is
charged with either capital murder or murder in the first degree be presumed
incompetent to proceed. 134 This presumption can be overcome, but the prosecution
bears the burden of proving competence by a preponderance of the evidence.' 35 This is
a counterintuitive provision for a state to enact at a time when our society wants to hold
violent children accountable for their crimes at a very young age. However, the
Arkansas Code realistically acknowledges that juveniles who commit such violent
crimes at a very young age are probably not competent for delinquency proceedings.
State statutes that codify incompetency due to chronological age or developmental
immaturity effectively recognize the patent developmental differences between adults
and juveniles. It is admirable that these states take a position that acknowledges the
developmental limitations of young juvenile delinquents. Unfortunately, most of the
statutes that do allow chronological immaturity as a basis for an incompetency finding
do not list a specific chronological age and do not define "immaturity." Without a
description of these key concepts, the effectiveness of the statute to declare juveniles
chronologically incompetent may be limited.
2. Mental Illness or Mental Retardation
Some state juvenile competency statutes specifically require that an incompetency
finding be based on mental illness or mental retardation. For example, the Texas Code
mandates that the incompetency finding be based on one of these two conditions. 36
Additionally, the Arizona Code states that "[tihe presence of a mental illness, defect or
disability alone is not grounds for finding a juvenile incompetent."'' 3 7 This practical
restriction is logical because a competent juvenile should not be found incompetent
merely because of a diagnosable mental illness that does not affect his competency.
Many juveniles may have the requisite capacity to meet the competency standards even
if they have a mild diagnosable mental condition. Arizona rightfully recognizes this
potential fact pattern and requires that a juvenile incompetency finding be predicated
on more than a medial diagnosis.
States that require an incompetency finding based on the presence of a mental
illness or mental retardation disregard developmental studies that support
133. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 and supra Part IV.B.
134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(b) (2002). Note that Arkansas's presumption in these
capital murder cases corresponds with developmental psychologists' suggestions that children
under thirteen cannot realistically be found competent. See supra text accompanying notes 79-
82.
135. § 9-27-502(b)(1)(B).
136. See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 55.31(a) (Vernon 2002).
137. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-291.01(B) (2005) (emphasis added).
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incompetency findings based on age or immaturity. 3 8 Consequently, these states may
allow incompetent juveniles to proceed because they do not have a diagnosable mental
disorder. 139 On the other hand, these states do eliminate much of the confusion that
results from recognizing chronological immaturity as an acceptable cause of
incompetency. It is much easier to diagnose a mental disorder or mental retardation
than it is to evaluate a juvenile based on maturity level. How should a state define
"immaturity?" How can it be measured? Does it vary from week-to-week or day-to-
day?
When a court declares ajuvenile incompetent based on a diagnosable mental illness
or mental retardation, it reassures society that the incompetent juvenile will not be
subjected to a juvenile justice system that he is not competent to handle. However, a
finding of "chronological incompetence" may send a signal that culpable delinquents
are "working the system" and not being held responsible for their actions. Each state
must analyze these issues and enact the juvenile competency statute that satisfies its
jurisdictional needs.
F. The Aftermath of an Incompetency Finding
States also differ on how to proceed once a juvenile court officially declares a
juvenile incompetent. While all states with juvenile competency legislation agree that
the delinquency proceeding cannot immediately continue after an incompetency
finding, states differ on the treatment specifics necessary to restore competency and the
acceptable length of treatment. The Florida Code is the most specific statute that deals
with the details of juvenile competency restoration and commitment proceedings. 140
The statute provides for different commitment outcomes for incompetent juveniles
based on whether they were deemed incompetent due to age or immaturity or due to
mental illness or mental retardation.
141
The statute mandates that any juvenile who is found incompetent because of age or
immaturity must not be committed to the state department of family services. 142
Furthermore, the Florida Code distinguishes commitment outcomes based on the
degree of the crime committed by the incompetent juvenile. The statute orders that any
juvenile deemed incompetent due to mental illness or retardation must be committed to
the department of family services if he committed a crime that would be an adult
felony, while an incompetent juvenile who committed a crime that would be an adult
misdemeanor must not be committed to family services. 43 These provisions
138. See supra Part IV.
139. Note that these state statutes would allow a proceeding against a juvenile who may have
a specific mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, which does not manifest its symptoms until
early adulthood. A juvenile in this situation would not meet the criteria for a diagnosable mental
disorder, but he may still suffer competency-diminishing effects of the mental illness. See supra
text accompanying notes 94-96.
140. Arizona also has a statute governing the aftermath of an incompetency finding, but it is
not as complete as the Florida statute and will not be used in this section. See ARIz. REv. STAT.
§ 8-291.09 (2005).
141. See FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(2)-(6) (West 2001).
142. § 985.223(2).
143. Id. The Florida statute mandates that committed children be sent to the Florida
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demonstrate Florida's preference to not commit juveniles even if they are incompetent
to proceed. The requirements also further the rehabilitative goals of the American
juvenile justice system by not subjecting a juvenile to unnecessary detention.
The Florida statute further mandates that juveniles deemed incompetent due to
mental illness or mental retardation must meet the criteria for secure placement before
they can be committed. 4 4 The statute states that the child may be placed in a secure
facility if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
The child is manifestly incapable of surviving with the help of willing and
responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and without
treatment or training the child is likely to either suffer from neglect or refuse to
care for self, and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of
substantial harm to the child's well-being; or there is a substantial likelihood that
in the near future the child will inflict serious bodily harm on self or others, as
evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm. 1
45
Furthermore, all available less-restrictive alternatives must be found inappropriate
before the state can commit the juvenile. ' The Florida statute takes all precautions to
ensure the well-being of the child and will not allow commitment unless it is absolutely
necessary for the health of the child and the community.
The statute even protects the juvenile during the actual commitment. It mandates
that the Florida Department of Children and Family Services place the juvenile in the
facility that is the "least restrictive alternative consistent with public safety."'147 The
service provider is required to file a written update report within at least six months of
the commitment date (or, alternatively, after any period of extended treatment or
training), at any additional time ordered by the juvenile court, and at any time the
provider determines that the juvenile has attained competency or no longer meets the
secure placement criteria. 14 The juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the juvenile for
up to two years after the date of incompetency, 149 but if, at the end of the two-year
period, the court determines the child has not attained competency and will not attain it
within one year, the court must dismiss the delinquency action.150 This requirement
prevents the state from indefinitely committing an incompetent juvenile in order to
keep him from society or to avoid proceeding with the delinquency action.
Department of Children and Family Services. Obviously, each state must determine which social
services facility could best handle the unique situation of incompetent juveniles.
144. See FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(3) (West 2001).
145. § 985.223(3)(a)(l)-(2) (emphasis added).
146. § 985.223(3)(b).
147. § 985.223(4).
148. § 985.223(4)(e).
149. But cf ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-291.09(F) (2005) (mandating that the Arizona competency
restoration order is valid for no more than 180 days).
150. FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(5)(c) (West 2001). The statute does suggest that the court
can retain jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding if there is evidence at the end of the two-
year commitment that the juvenile will regain competency within a year.
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VI. TOWARD A MODEL JUVENILE COMPETENCY STATUTE
This Note advocates the necessity of juvenile competency statutes for proper
juvenile due process protection and for the equal administration ofjustice within each
state system. Part V outlined the common provisions from various existing state
juvenile competency statutes and should serve as a starting point for states to enact or
revise their own juvenile competency legislation. Attached as Appendix is what I
propose to be the model juvenile competency statute. It is constructed from the
framework of the common provisions outlined in Part V. 151
While most of the components of the statute are not particularly controversial, the
Model Statute does allow chronological immaturity as an acceptable cause ofjuvenile
incompetency. This proposition is supported by the developmental psychology
research and scholarship outlined in Part IV.A and the NIMH biological brain study
described in Part IV.B. The Model Statute mandates that juveniles under the age of
thirteen be presumed incompetent. This is a rebuttable presumption, but the burden
should be on the state to prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that a juvenile
under the age of thirteen is competent to proceed in a juvenile delinquency hearing.
The presumption of incompetence for "young juveniles"'1 2 is consistent with public
policy and due process requirements. Our criminal justice system does not subject
incompetent adults to the criminal system, and it should not subject incompetent
juveniles to the juvenile justice system. If we can determine which juveniles are likely
to be incompetent due to age, the Model Statute should presume them incompetent to
protect their state-acknowledged rights. Both the Cowden and McKee study15 3 and the
NIMH research 54 show that young juveniles under the age of thirteen are likely
incompetent. It is not coincidence that the developmental psychology research and the
biological brain development study both note the correlation of the age thirteen with
the development of the young juvenile brain during puberty. The NIMH study notes a
significant growth of gray matter in the brain just prior to the age of thirteen followed
by a period of increased development of the executive functions of the brain that
continues until young adulthood.155 Therefore, a presumption of incompetence for
young juveniles protects them in a system in which they cannot protect themselves. The
tender age of a young juvenile alerts the judge that he is likely incompetent to
understand the proceedings and thus cannot assist counsel in his defense.
CONCLUSION
The right for ajuvenile to be competent in the juvenile justice system comports with
due process protections that should be recognized by all states. States that recognize
the juvenile competency right need to protect juveniles by enacting comprehensive and
detailed legislation that fully outlines the competency determination process. The
151. Certain provisions of the Model Statute are taken from existing state juvenile
competency statutes. Other provisions are based on my own research of the juvenile competency
issue.
152. For a definition of "young juvenile," see infra Appendix, Model Statute § (b)(2).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
154. See supra Part IV.B.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
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Model Statute drafted here meets that challenge and furthers the objectives of the
American juvenile justice system.
Appendix
§ XX-XX-XX: Model Statute for Juvenile Competency Determination
(a) Application
(1) The provisions of this statute shall apply to any juvenile delinquency
proceeding where the juvenile's fitness to proceed is raised as an issue by
any party or sua sponte by the court.
(2) Once an issue of the juvenile's competency is raised, the delinquency
proceeding shall temporarily cease until a determination is made on the
competence of the juvenile pursuant to the following provisions.
(3) Following a competency examination, the court shall determine how to
proceed pursuant to subsection (g).
(b) Definitions
(1) "Juvenile" means a person who is under eighteen years of age at the time
the issue of competency is raised.
(2) "Young juvenile" means a person who is under thirteen years of age at
the time the issue of competency is raised.
(3) "Incompetent" means a juvenile who does not have sufficient present
ability to participate and consult with his defense counsel with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding, or who does not have a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
(4) "Mental Health Expert" means a physician licensed pursuant to State
standards or a psychologist licensed pursuant to State standards who is all of
the following:
(A) Familiar with this State's competency standards and statutes;
(B) Familiar with this State's available treatment, training, and
restoration programs; and
(C) Certified by the court as meeting State developed guidelines in
juvenile competency evaluation.
(5) "Mental Illness" is any diagnosable mental impairment supported by the
latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM).
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(6) "Mental Retardation" is a disability characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.
(7) "Chronological Immaturity" is a condition based on the juvenile's
chronological age or significant lack of developmental skills where the
juvenile has no significant mental illness or mental retardation.
(c) Procedure
A party shall raise the competency issue by filing a petition with the court. The
petition shall state the facts in support of the request for a competency examination.
(1) The court shall rule on the petition and, if it sees fit, order the juvenile to
be examined to aid in the determination of his mental fitness to proceed in
the delinquency hearing. All examinations and expert reports must conform
to the requirements of section (e) below.
(2) Whenever possible, a physical or mental health competency examination
shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, but if the court deems it necessary,
the court may order the juvenile admitted as an inpatient to a suitable
medical facility for the purpose of the examination pursuant to subsections
(3) and (4) below.
(3) The court may order the juvenile be detained to submit to any physical,
neurological, or psychological examination to adequately determine the
juvenile's mental competence condition if the juvenile meets the following
criteria:
(A) The juvenile will not submit to an outpatient examination,
(B) The juvenile refuses to appear for an examination, or
(C) An adequate examination is not possible without the detention
of the juvenile.
(4) If the juvenile is detained or committed for an inpatient examination, the
examination shall not exceed the period of time that is necessary for the
examination. In all cases, detention or commitment for examination must not
exceed fourteen days.
(d) Experts
(1) The court will appoint not less than two (2) and no more than three (3)
mental health experts who meet the requirements outlined in subsection
(b)(4).
(A) At least one of the court-appointed experts must be a
psychiatrist licensed pursuant to State standards.
(B) The other mental health experts must also meet the
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requirements outlined in subsection (b)(4).
(2) Any party may retain one (1) expert at its own expense, but the party-
retained expert must meet the requirements outlined in subsection (b)(4).
(e) Expert Report Criteria
(1) An evaluating mental health expert's report must address and evaluate
the juvenile's capacity and ability to do each of the following:
(A) Appreciate the charges or allegations against him;
(B) Appreciate the nature of the adversarial process including:
(i) Ability to understand the participants in the juvenile
delinquency proceeding (e.g., judge, defense counsel,
State attorney, mental health expert, etc.), and
(ii) Ability to realize the role of each participant in his
proceeding.
(C) Appreciate the range of possible penalties that may be imposed
in the proceedings against him including:
(i) Ability to consider the impact of his actions on others,
and
(ii) Ability to recognize how possible penalties imposed
in the proceeding will affect him.
(D) Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at issue
including:
(i) Ability to articulate thoughts,
(ii) Ability to articulate emotions, and
(iii) Ability to accurately and reliably relate a sequence of
events.
(E) Display logical decision making;
(F) Display appropriate courtroom behavior;
(G) Testify relevantly at proceeding.
(2) In assessing the juvenile's competency the mental health expert shall:
(A) Conduct an age-appropriate mental status exam using tests
designed for juveniles;
(B) Conduct an age-appropriate psychological evaluation using
tests designed for juveniles; and
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(C) Consider any other relevant tests or information.
(3) The expert report must conclude if the juvenile suffers from mental
illness, mental retardation, or chronological immaturity.
(A) If mental illness, mental retardation, or chronological
immaturity exist, the expert must report the severity of the
impairment and its potential effect on the juvenile's competency to
proceed.
(B) If the expert determines that the juvenile suffers from
chronological immaturity, the expert must compare the juvenile to
normal juveniles of the same age.
(C) If the expert determines that the juvenile suffers from a mental
illness, he must also provide the following information:
(i) The prognosis of the mental illness;
(ii) If the mental illness is treatable with medication and if
the juvenile is taking any medication; and
(iii) How medication may affect the juvenile in the
delinquency process.
(4) The expert report must state the expert's final conclusion of the
juvenile's competence or incompetence and list specific reasons for the
conclusion supported by results of the examination pursuant to the specified
expert report criteria.
(A) If the mental health expert concludes that the juvenile is
incompetent to proceed, the expert must give an opinion as to the
possibility of future competence and an estimated time period in
which competence could be restored with treatment.
(B) If the mental health expert concludes that the juvenile is
competent to proceed, the court may resume the juvenile
delinquency proceeding if it sees fit or may require further
competency examination by another court-appointed mental health
expert.
(f) Acceptable Causes of Incompetency
(1) A juvenile can be declared incompetent if he suffers from a mental
illness that substantially affects his ability to assist counsel in his defense or
to understand the proceedings against him. While a mental illness can
support an incompetency finding, the existence of a mental illness alone
cannot predicate a finding of incompetency.
(2) A juvenile can be declared incompetent if he suffers from mental
retardation that substantially affects his ability to assist counsel in his
defense or to understand the proceedings against him. While mental
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retardation can support an incompetency finding, mental retardation alone
cannot predicate a finding of incompetency.
(3) A juvenile can be declared incompetent based on chronological
immaturity that substantially affects his ability to assist counsel in his
defense or to understand the proceedings against him.
(A) Young juveniles under the age of thirteen when the competency
issue is raised shall be presumed incompetent to proceed in the
delinquency proceeding. The burden of proof is on the state to
overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence that
the juvenile is competent to proceed.
(B) A juvenile who is found incompetent due to chronological
immaturity may not be committed to the State Department of Child
Services for competency rehabilitation treatment.
(i) If the mental health expert determines that there is a
reasonable chance that the juvenile will become
competent within 365 days, the proceedings shall be
temporarily suspended and a new complete examination
shall be conducted in 365 days.
(ii) If the mental health expert determines that there is not
a reasonable chance that the juvenile will become
competent within 365 days, the court may order that the
delinquency proceedings permanently cease.
(g) Aftermath of an Incompetency Finding
(1) If a mental health expert determines that a juvenile is incompetent to
proceed under one of the acceptable causes of incompetency outlined in (f),
the court may choose to accept the incompetency finding or order a new
expert examination.
(2) If the court accepts the incompetency finding, it must determine whether
the juvenile meets the criteria for secure placement in the State Department
of Child Services. A juvenile may be placed in a secure facility if the court
makes a finding by clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) The juvenile is incompetent due to significant mental illness or
mental retardation, and because of the significant mental illness or
mental retardation:
(i)There is a real and present threat of substantial harm to
the juvenile's well-being, or there is a substantial
likelihood that in the near future the juvenile will inflict
serious bodily harm on himself or others as evidenced by
recent behavior; and
(ii) All available less restrictive alternatives are
inappropriate.
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(B) If the juvenile meets the secure facility placement requirements
outlined in this subsection and is subsequently confined, the
juvenile must be released back to the jurisdiction of the court if he
becomes competent. The court will then determine how to proceed.
(3) If the court accepts the incompetency finding and determines that the
juvenile does not meet the secure placement criteria, the court must analyze
the mental health expert's opinion of potential competency restoration and
determine:
(A) if there is a reasonable chance that the juvenile will attain
competency in 365 days with treatment. If so, then the court must
order that the delinquency proceeding temporarily cease and issue a
restoration order for the juvenile. Restoration orders should
specify:
(i) The name of the restoration program provider and the
location of the program,
(ii) The length of the restoration program, and
(iii) The frequency of restoration program provider
reports and an outline of desired report content. The
program provider must immediately report to the court if
it believes the juvenile is competent to proceed.
(B) if there is not a reasonable chance that the juvenile will attain
competency in 365 days with treatment. In this situation, the court
may order that the delinquency proceeding permanently cease.
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